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Figure 1: System Overview. We extract biological signals from facial regions on authentic and fake portrait video pairs.
We apply transformations to compute the spatial coherence and temporal consistency, capture the signal characteristics in
feature sets and PPG maps, and train a probabilistic SVM and a CNN. Then, we aggregate authenticity probabilities to decide
whether the video is fake or authentic.
Abstract
We present a novel approach to detect synthetic content
in portrait videos, as a preventive solution for the emerg-
ing threat of deep fakes. In other words, we introduce a
deep fake detector. We observe that detectors blindly utiliz-
ing deep learning are not effective in catching fake content,
as generative models produce formidably realistic results.
Our key assertion follows that biological signals hidden in
portrait videos can be used as an implicit descriptor of au-
thenticity, because they are neither spatially nor temporally
preserved in fake content. To prove and exploit this asser-
tion, we first exhibit several unary and binary signal trans-
formations for the pairwise separation problem, achieving
99.39% accuracy. Second, we utilize those findings to for-
mulate a generalized classifier for fake content, by ana-
lyzing proposed signal transformations and corresponding
feature sets. Third, we generate novel signal maps and em-
ploy a CNN to improve our traditional classifier for detect-
ing synthetic content. Lastly, we release an “in the wild”
dataset of fake portrait videos that we collected as a part
of our evaluation process. We evaluate FakeCatcher both
on Face Forensics dataset [56] and on our new Deep Fakes
dataset, performing with 96% and 91.07% accuracies re-
spectively. In addition, our approach produces a signifi-
cantly superior detection rate against baselines, and does
not depend on the source, generator, or properties of the
fake content. We also analyze signals from various facial
regions, with varying segment durations, and under several
dimensionality reduction techniques.
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1. Introduction
As we enter into the AI era, the technological advance-
ments in deep learning started to revolutionize our perspec-
tive on how we solve difficult problems in computer vision,
robotics, and related areas. Common deep learning mod-
els for recognition, classification, and segmentation tasks
tend to improve how we and machines perceive, learn, and
analyze the world. On the other hand, the developments
in generative models [24, 55, 81, 71] significantly increase
how machines tend to mimic the world and create realistic
data. Even though it is easy to speculate dystopian scenar-
ios based on both analysis and synthesis approaches, the
latter brought the immediate threat on information integrity
by disabling our “natural detectors”: we cannot simply look
at an image to determine its authenticity.
Following the recent initiatives for democratization of
AI, generative models are getting increasingly popular and
accessible. Although the widespread use of generative
adversarial networks (GAN) is positively impacting some
technologies (i.e., personalized avatars [49], animations
[54], and image inpainting [43]), there are also uses of
GANs with malicious intent, which impacts the society by
introducing inauthentic content (i.e., celebrity porn [3], fake
news [2], and AI art [1]). This lack of authenticity and
increasing information obfuscation pose real threats to in-
dividuals, criminal system, and information integrity. As
every technology is simultaneously built with the counter-
technology to neutralize its negative effects, we believe that
it is the perfect time to develop a deep fake detector to pre-
vent this threat before having serious consequences.
Although there are recent purely deep learning ap-
proaches to detect fake content, those are limited by the
specific generative model [4], dataset [56], people [5], or
hand-crafted features [42]. In contrast to all, we choose to
search for some natural priors in authentic content, instead
of putting some assumptions on fake content. Biological
signals (such as heart rate) have been exploited in images
for medical [60] and security purposes [57], therefore we
wonder: Do generative models capture biological signals?
If not, can we formulate how and why they fail to do so?
We observe that, even though GANs learn and generate
photorealistic visual and geometric signals beyond the dis-
criminative capabilities of human eyes, biological signals
hidden by nature are still not easily replicable. Biological
signals are also intuitive and complimentary ingredients of
facial videos – which is the domain of deep fakes. More-
over, videos, as opposed to images, contain another layer
of complexity to becloud fake synthesis: the consistency
in the time dimension. Together with the signals’ spatial
coherence, temporal consistency is the key prior to detect
authentic content. To complete this narrative, our approach
exploits biological signals to detect fake content on portrait
videos, independent of the source of creation.
Our main contributions include,
• formulations and experimental validations of signal
transformations to exploit spatial coherence and tem-
poral consistency of biological signals, for both pair-
wise and general authenticity classification,
• a generalized and interpretable deep fake detector that
operates in-the-wild,
• a novel biological signal map construction to train neu-
ral networks for authenticity classification,
• a diverse dataset of portrait videos to create a test bed
for fake content detection in the wild.
Our system processes input videos (Figure 1a) by col-
lecting video segments with facial parts, defining several
regions of interests within each face (Figure 1b), and ex-
tracting several biological signals (Figure 1c) from those
regions in those segments. In the first part of our paper; we
scrutinize the pairwise separation problem where the video
pairs are given but the fake one is not known. We formulate
a solution by examining the extracted biological signals,
their transformations to different domains (time, frequency,
time-frequency), and their correlations (Figure 1d). In the
second part, we combine the revelations from the pairwise
context and interpretable feature extractors in the literature
(Figure 1e) to develop a generalized authenticity classifier
working in a high dimensional feature space (Figure 1f).
In the third part, we transform the signals into novel sig-
nal maps of those segments to train a simple convolutional
deep fake detector network (Figure 1g). We also aggregate
the class probabilities of segments in a video into a binary
“fake or authentic” decision (Figure 1h).
To evaluate FakeCatcher, we collected over 140 online
videos, totaling up to a “Deep Fakes” dataset of 30GB. It is
important to note that, unlike existing datasets, our dataset
includes “in the wild” videos, independent of the generative
model, resolution, compression, content, and context. Our
simple CNN achieves 91.07% accuracy for detecting inau-
thentic content on our dataset, and 96% accuracy on Face
Forensics dataset [56], beating all baseline architectures we
compared against. We also analyzed the effects of segment
durations, facial regions, and dimensionality reduction tech-
niques; on mentioned datasets, on our feature sets, and on
our signal transformations.
2. Related Work
Traditionally, image spoofing and forgery has been an
important topic in forensics and security, with correspond-
ing pixel and frequency analysis solutions to detect visual
artifacts [72]. These methods, in addition to early deep gen-
erative models, were able to create some inauthentic con-
tent. However, the results were easily classified as fake or
real by the human eye, as opposed to recent deep fakes.
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2.1. GAN Empowerment
Following GANs proposed by Goodfellow et al. [24],
deep learning models have been advancing in generative
tasks for inpainting [30], translation [81], and editing [11].
Inherently, all generative approaches suffer from the con-
trol over generation. In the context of GANs, this prob-
lem is mostly explored by Variational Autoencoders (VAE)
[36] and Conditional GANs [67] to control the generation
by putting constraints in the latent space. In addition to the
improvements in controlling GANs, other approaches im-
proved training efficiency, accuracy, and realism of GANs
by deep convolutions [55], Wasserstein distances [25], least
squares [44], and progressive growing [33]. It is arguable
that these developments, in addition to the availability of
such models, seeded the authenticity problem.
2.2. Synthetic Faces
Since Viola-Jones [70], computer vision community
treasures the domain of facial images and videos as one
of the primary application areas. Therefore, numerous
applications and explorations of GANs emerged for face
completion [43], facial attribute manipulation [61, 16, 27],
frontal view synthesis [29], facial reenactment [35, 68, 76],
identity-preserving synthesis [8], and expression editing
[20]. In particular, advancements in generative power, re-
alism, and efficiency of VAEs and GANs for facial reenact-
ment and video synthesis resulted in the emergence of the
“deep fake” concept, which is replacing the face of a tar-
get person with another face in a given video, as seamless
as possible. The exact approach is not published, however
the deep fake generator is assumed to consist of two au-
toencoders trained on source and target videos: Keeping the
encoder weights similar, so that general features can be em-
bedded in the encoder and face-specific features can be inte-
grated by the decoder. Another approach, Face2Face [68],
reconstructs a target face from a video and then warps it
with the blend shapes obtained by the source video in real-
time. Deep Video Portraits [35] and vid2vid [71] follow
this approach and employ GANs instead of blend shapes.
Overall, the results are realistic, but there are still skipped
frames and face misalignments due to illumination, occlu-
sion, compression, and sudden motions.
2.3. Image Forensics
In par with the increasing number of inauthentic facial
images and videos, methods for detecting such have also
been proposed. Those are mostly based on finding inconsis-
tencies in images, such as detecting distortions [10], finding
compression artifacts [9], and assessing image quality [23].
However, for synthetic images in our context, the noise and
distortions are harder to detect due to the non-linearity and
complexity of the learning process [40].
There exist two different strategies to tackle this prob-
lem, (i) pure deep learning based approaches that act as a
detector of a specific generative model [4, 66, 26, 34, 78,
80], and (ii) semantic approaches that evaluate the gener-
ated faces’ realism [45, 39, 42]. The methods in the first
branch investigate the color and noise distributions of spe-
cific networks [41, 59], or train CNNs blindly for synthetic
images [4, 66]. However, they are unfit to be accepted as
general synthetic portrait video detection mechanisms, as
they rely heavily on detecting artifacts inherent to specific
generative models. Semantic approaches, on the other hand,
utilize inconsistencies in the biological domain, such as fa-
cial attributes [45], mouth movement inconsistency [39],
and blink detection [42]. Our motivation follows the second
stream, however we explore real signals instead of physical
attributes. Thus our input is continuous, complex, and sta-
ble; making our system embrace both perspectives.
2.4. Biological Signals
The remote extraction of biological signals roots back
to the medical community to explore less invasive meth-
ods for patient monitoring. Observing subtle changes of
color and motion in RGB videos [75, 15] enable meth-
ods such as remote photoplethysmography (rPPG or iPPG)
[58, 52] and head motion based ballistocardiogram (BCD)
[7]. We mostly focus on PPG as it is robust against dynamic
scenes, while BCD needs static videos. Several approaches
proposed improvements to PPG, using chrominance fea-
tures [19], green channel components [79], optical prop-
erties [21], kalman filters [53], and different facial areas
[79, 69, 21, 58]. We believe that all of these PPG variations
contain valuable information in the context of fake videos.
In addition, inter-consistency of PPG signals from various
locations on a face is higher in real videos than synthetic
ones. Multiple signals also help us regularize the environ-
mental effects (illumination, occlusion, motion, etc.) for ro-
bustness. Thus, we will use a combination of the aforemen-
tioned biological signals, as introduced in the next chapter.
3. Biological Signal Analysis on
Fake & Authentic Video Pairs
We employ the following six signals S =
{Gl, Gr, Gm, Cl, Cr, Cm} that are combinations of G
channel-based PPG [79] (robust against compression
artifacts) and chrominance-based PPG [19] (robust against
illumination artifacts) on left cheek, right cheek [21], and
mid-region [69]. Each signal is named with the first letter
of the channel followed by the face region as the subscript.
Figure 2 demonstrates those signals extracted from a
real-fake video pair, where each signal is color-coded with
the facial region it is extracted from. We declare signal and
transformation notations for the rest of the paper in Table 1.
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Figure 2: Biological Signals. Green (top) and chrom-PPG (middle) extracted from left (L - red), middle (M - green), and
right (R - blue) regions; heart rates (bottom); and sample frames of original (left) and synthetic (right) videos.
Symbol Signal or Transformation
S {GL, GR, GM , CL, CR, CM}
SC {CL, CR, CM}
D {|CL −GL|, |CR −GR|, |CM −GM |}
DC {|CL − CM |, |CL − CR|, |CR − CM |}
A(S) autocorrelation
Aˆ(S) spectral autocorrelation
φ(Sx, Sy) cross correlation
P (S) power spectral density
Ap(SC) pairwise cross spectral densities
L(S) log scale
X(S) discrete cosine transform
W (S) Wavelet transform
Y (S) Lyapunov function [48]
G(S) Gabor-Wigner transform [51]
Table 1: Definitions. Signals and transformation functions
used throughout the analysis.
In order to understand the nature of biological signals in
the context of synthetic content, we first compare signal re-
sponses in original (PPGo) and synthetic (PPGs) video
pairs using traditional signal processing methods: log scale
(L), Butterworth filter [13] (H), power spectral density (P ),
and combinations (Figure 3). We start by comparing sig-
nals (top) and their derivatives (bottom) to apprehend differ-
ence in behaviors and formulate that distinction (i.e., fourth
column shows contrasting structure for their power spec-
tra). The motivation behind this analysis is to investigate
the preservation of spatial coherence and temporal consis-
tency in synthetic videos, and to bring forth an error metric
that encapsulates these findings in a generalized classifier.
This analysis also sets ground for understanding generative
systems in terms of biological replicability.
3.1. Statistical Features
We set our first task as the pairwise separation problem:
Given pairs of original and fake videos without their labels,
can we take advantage of biological signals for labeling
these videos correctly to their respective classes? We use
150 pairs of fake and authentic videos in the test subset of
Face Forensics [56] as a base, splitting each video into ω-
length windows (the value for ω is extensively analyzed in
Section 5.3). Our analysis starts by comparing simple sta-
tistical properties such as mean(µ), standard deviation(σ),
and min-max ranges of Gm and Cm from original and syn-
thetic video pairs. By simply thresholding these values, we
observed an initial accuracy of 65% for this pairwise separa-
tion task (Figure 4, first row). Then, influenced by the signal
behavior displayed in Figure 3, we investigated these met-
rics on absolute values of differences between consecutive
frames (i.e., µ(|Gm(tn)−Gm(tn+1)|)), achieving 75.69%
accuracy (Figure 4, second row). We concluded that these
features are aggregating the whole segment signals into sin-
gle values that are not representative enough.
3.2. Power Spectra
In addition to analyzing signals in time domain, we also
investigate their behavior in frequency domain. Threshold-
ing their power spectrum density (P (S)) in linear and log
scales results in an accuracy of 79.33% (similar to Figure 4,
third row) using the following formula:
µP (Glo ) + σP (Glo ) − (µP (Gls ) + σP (Gls )) (1)
Figure 3: Raw Signals. Characteristics of biological sig-
nals (top), same analysis on derivative of signals (bottom),
from original (blue) and synthetic (orange) video pairs.
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where the definitions of P and Gl can be found in Table
1, and subscripts denote Glo for original and Gls for syn-
thetic. We also analyze discrete cosine transforms (X) of
the log scale of these signals. Including DC and first three
AC components, we obtain 77.41% accuracy (Supplemental
Material B.4). We further improve the accuracy to 91.33%
by using only the zero-frequency (DC value) of X.
3.3. Spatio-temporal Analysis
Combining previous two sections, we also run some
analysis for the coherence of biological signals within each
segment. For robustness against illumination changes,
we alternate between Cl and Cm (Table 1), and com-
pute the cross-correlation of their power spectral den-
sity as φ(P (Cm), P (Cl)). Comparing the maximum val-
ues gives us 94.57% and mean values gives us 97.28%
accuracy for pairwise separation. We improve this re-
sult by first computing power spectral densities in the
log scale φ(L(P (Cm)), L(P (Cl))) (98.79%), and even
further by computing the cross power spectral densities
µ(Ap(L(SCo)) − Ap(L(SCs))) (99.39%) (Figure 4, last
row). This final formulation results in an accuracy of
95.06% on the entire Face Forensic dataset (train, test and
validation sets), and 83.55% on our Deep Fakes dataset.
4. Generalized Authentic Content Classifier
We hypothesize that our metric to separate pairs of orig-
inal and synthetic videos with an accuracy of 99.39% is a
promising candidate to formulate the inconsistency into a
generalized binary classifier. In the pairwise setting, com-
parison of aggregate spatio-temporal features are represen-
tative enough. However, as these signals are continuous and
noisy, there is no universal hard limit to robustly classify
such content. To build a generalized classifier, we exper-
iment with several signal transformations in time and fre-
quency domains to explore the artifacts of synthetic content
towards characteristic feature sets (Table 1).
4.1. Feature Sets
We explored several features to be extracted from the sig-
nals declared in Table 1. Due to the fact that rPPG is mostly
evaluated by the accuracy in heart rate, we consult other fea-
tures used in image authenticity [40], classification of EEG
signals [31, 50], statistical analysis [77, 64, 28], and emo-
tion recognition [48, 50]. These feature sets are enumerated
in Table 2 together with the reference papers for biological
Figure 4: Pairwise Analysis. Example original and synthetic signal pair Cmo and Cms , their derivatives δCm, power
spectral densities P (L(Cm)), discrete cosine transforms X(Cm), cross correlation φ(Cm, Cl)), and cross power spectral
density Ap(SC) (left). Histograms of mean differences of these values for all pairs in the dataset (right).
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Feature Explanation Reference
F1 mean and maximum of cross spectral density Sec. 3.3
F2 RMS of differences, std., mean of absolute differences, ratio of negative differences, [64]
zero crossing rate, avg. prominence of peaks, std. prominence of peaks, avg. peak width,
std. peak width, max./min. derivative, mean derivative, mean spectral centroid
F3 nb of narrow pulses in spectral autocorrelation, nb of spectral lines in spectral [28]
autocorrelation, average energy of narrow pulses, max. spectral autocorrelation
F4 std., std. of mean values of 1 sec windows, RMS of 1 sec differences, mean std. of differences [32]
std. of differences, mean of autocorrelation, Shannon entropy
F5 first n Wavelet coefficients W (S) [31, 48]
F6 largest n Lyapunov exponents Y (S) [48]
F7 max. of spectral power density of normalized centered instantaneous amplitude, std. of [77]
abs. value of the centered non-linear component of instantaneous phase, std. of centered
non-linear component of direct instantaneous phase, std. of abs. value of normalized centered
instantaneous amplitude, kurtosis of the normalized instantaneous amplitude
F8 log scale power of delta (1-4HZ), theta (4-8HZ), and alpha (8-13HZ) bands [50]
F9 mean amplitude of high frequency signals, slope of PSD curves between high and low [38]
frequencies, variance of inter-peak distances
Table 2: Feature Sets. Feature sets (left) from all experiments are explained (middle) and documented by a reference (right).
signal classification. We exhaustively document all possi-
ble feature extractors in the literature for robustness and we
refer the reader to specific papers for the formulation and
explanation of their features.
f |f | f˜
F3(Aˆ(S)) 4× 6 67.55%
F6(L(S)) 600 69.04%
F4(log(S)) 60 69.07%
F2(S) 13× 6 69.26%
F5(P (W (S))) 390 69.63%
F4(S)∪ 6× 6 +
F3(log(S))∪ 4× 6 + 71.34%
µAp(DC) 3
F4(log(S) ∪Ap(DC))∪ 6× 9 +
∪ F1(log(DC))∪ 6 + 72.01%
F3(log(S) ∪Ap(DC)) 4× 9
Table 3: Experiments. < Fn from 2> (<transformation
from 1> (<signal set from 1>)) (left), size of the feature
vector (middle), and the segment classification accuracy
(right) of some experiments.
4.2. Authenticity Classification
Following our motivation to understand biological sig-
nals in the context of fake content, we covet interpretable
features with no assumption on the fake content. This is
the key motivation that leads us to employ SVMs with a
RBF kernel [18] for this binary classification task, instead
of a DNN. We conduct many experiments by training an
SVM using feature vectors extracted from the training set
for classifying arbitrary content as fake or authentic, and
then report the accuracy of that SVM on the test set. All of
these experiments are denoted with F∗(T (S)) where F∗ is
the feature extractor from Table 2 applied to (transformed)
signal T (S) from Table 1. Both signal transformation and
feature extraction can be applied to all elements of the inner
set.
For our exploration, we combine all subsets of the Face
Forensics dataset [56] and randomly split the combined
dataset to training (1540 samples, 60%) and test sets (1054
samples, 40%). We create feature vectors with maximum
and mean (F1) of cross power spectral densities of SC
(Ap(SC)) for all videos in the training set, as it was the
feature with the highest accuracy from Section 3.3. Un-
like pairwise results, SVM accuracy with f = F1(Ap(SC))
is low (68.93%) but this sets a baseline for the follow-
ing experiments. Next, we classify by f = µP (S) (six
features per sample) achieving 68.88% accuracy, and by
f = µAp(DC) ∪ µA(S) (9 features per sample) achieving
69.63% accuracy on the entire [56] dataset. Among 7 of the
70 experiments we have conducted using a combination of
features are listed in Table 3. Other 63 experiments, both
on [56] dataset and our Deep Fakes dataset, are listed in
Supplementary Material A.
Based on our experiments, we conclude that “authentic-
ity” (i) is observed both in time and frequency domains, (ii)
is highly sensitive to small changes in motion, illumination,
and compression, and (iii) can be discovered from the co-
herence and consistency of multiple biological signals. We
would like our system to be independent of any genera-
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tive model, any compression/transmission artifact, and any
content-related influence: a robust and generalized Fake-
Catcher, based on the essence of temporal consistency and
spatial coherence of biological signals in authentic videos.
Our experimental results conclude on this feature set:
f = F1(log(DC)) ∪
F3(log(S) ∪Ap(DC)) ∪
F4(log(S) ∪Ap(DC)) ∪
µAˆ(S) ∪max(Aˆ(S))
The SVM classifier trained with these 126 features on the
[56] dataset results in 75% accuracy. We also perform the
same experiment on our Deep Fakes dataset (with a 60/40
split) obtaining an accuracy of 76.78%.
4.3. Probabilistic Video Classification
As mentioned in Section 3.1, the videos are split into ω-
interval segments for authenticity classification. Consider-
ing that our end goal is to classify videos, we aggregate the
segment labels into video labels by majority voting. Ma-
jority voting increases the segment classification accuracy
of 75% to 78.18% video classification accuracy within Face
Forensics dataset, hinting that some hard failure segments
can be neglected due to significant motion or illumination
changes. Consequently, we convert our SVM to an SVR to
output the probability of containing authentic or synthetic
content. Instead of majority voting, assigning labels based
on the mean of the segment class probabilities increased the
video classification to 82.55% in Face Forensics. Using the
same probabilistic classification, we achieve 80.35% video
accuracy on our Deep Fakes dataset.
4.4. CNN-based Classification
Investigating the failures of our probabilistic authentic-
ity classification, we realize that our misclassification rate
of marking real segments as synthetic segments (false posi-
tive, FP) is higher than our misclassification rate of marking
synthetic segments as real segments (false negative, FN).
The samples ending up as false positives contain artifacts
that corrupt PPG signals, such as camera movement, mo-
tion and uneven illumination. In order to improve the re-
siliency against such artifacts, we cerebrate that we can ex-
ploit the coherence of signals by increasing the number of
regions of interests (ROIs) within a face. We hypothesize
that coherence will be observed stronger in real videos, as
artifacts tend to be localized into specific regions in the face.
However packing more signals will further grow exponen-
tially the already complex feature space (see Section 5.5)
for our authenticity classifier. Therefore, we switch to a
CNN-based classifier instead, which is more suitable for a
higher-dimensional segment classification task (Figure 6).
4.4.1 PPG Maps
Similar to Section 4.2, we extract Cm signals from the
mid-region of faces, as it is robust against non-planar ro-
tations. To generate same size subregions, we map the non-
rectangular ROI into a rectangular one using Delaunay Tri-
angulation [22], therefore each pixel in the actual ROI (each
data point for Cm) corresponds to the same pixel in the gen-
erated rectangular image. We then divide the rectangular
image into 32 same size sub-regions. For each of these sub-
regions, we calculateCm = {Cm0 , . . . , Cmω}, and normal-
ize them to [0, 255] interval. We combine these values for
each sub-region within ω frame window into an ω× 32 im-
age, called PPG map, where each row holds one sub-region
and each column holds one frame. Example real and syn-
thetic PPG maps are shown in Figure 5.
4.4.2 Learning Authenticity
We use a simple three layer convolutional network with
pooling layers in between and two dense connections at the
end (Figure 6). We use ReLU activations except the last
layer, which is a sigmoid to output binary labels. We also
add a dropout before the last layer to prevent overfitting. We
do not perform any data augmentation and feed PPG maps
directly. Our model achieves 88.97% segment and 90.66%
video classification accuracy when trained on [56] train set
and tested on the [56] test set with ω = 128. Similarly,
Figure 5: PPG Maps. PPG signals per sub-region per frame are converted into 128× 32 images for five synthetic (top) and
original (bottom) segments.
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our model obtains 80.41% segment and 82.69% video clas-
sification accuracy when trained on our Deep Fakes dataset
with a random split of 60/40.
Figure 6: CNN Architecture. Three convolutional layers
with max pooling, followed by dense layers.
4.4.3 Spectral PPG Maps
As it is discussed in Section 3.3, frequency domain also
holds important consistency information for detecting au-
thentic content. Thus, we enhance our PPG maps with
the addition of encoding binned power spectral densities
P (Cm) = {P (Cm)0, . . . , P (Cm)ω} from each sub-region,
creating ω × 64 size images. This attempt to exploit tem-
poral consistency improves our accuracy for segment and
video classification to 94.26% and 96% in Face Forensics,
and 87.42% and 91.07% in Deep Fakes datasets.
5. Results and Analysis
Our system utilizes Matlab [46] for signal processing,
Open Face library [6] for face detection, libSVM [14]
for the classification experiments, and Wavelab [12] for
Wavelet transformation and F5 feature set. In this section,
we first describe the benchmark datasets and introduce our
new Deep Fakes dataset. Then we examine some parame-
ters of the system, such as the facial regions of signals in
S, segment durations ω, and dimensionality reduction tech-
niques on the feature set F . We also compare our system
against other detectors, demonstrate that our system is supe-
rior to complex baseline architectures, and summarize our
experimental outcomes.
5.1. Datasets
First, we use the Face Forensics dataset [56], which has
(i) original and synthetic pairs of videos with same content
and actor, and (ii) a compilation of original and synthetic
videos, both of which are created using the same generative
model [68]. The train/validation/test sets of [56] contain
704, 150 and 150 videos, respectively.
Although [56] is a clean dataset perfect for initial ex-
periments, we need an “in the wild” dataset to assess the
generalizability of our findings. For this purpose, we col-
lected “in the wild” portrait videos, more than half of them
being synthetic. The videos in our dataset are diverse real-
world samples in terms of the source generative model, res-
olution, compression, illumination, aspect-ratio, frame rate,
motion, pose, cosmetics, occlusion, content, and context, as
it originates from various sources such as news articles and
research presentations; totaling up to 142 videos, 32 min-
utes, and 30 GBs. Synthetic videos are matched with their
original counterparts when possible. Figure 7 demonstrates
a subset of the Deep Fakes dataset, original videos placed
in the top half and fakes in the bottom half. A small clip
consisting of several videos in the dataset can also be found
in Supplemental Material D. The dataset is released on our
project page1. High accuracy on Deep Fakes dataset sub-
stantiates that FakeCatcher is robust to low-resolution, com-
pression, motion, illumination, occlusion, pose, and cos-
metics; that enrich the input and slightly reduce the accu-
racy, without preprocessing.
Figure 7: Deep Fakes Dataset. We introduce a diverse
dataset of original (top) and fake (bottom) portrait video
pairs, collected from online sources.
5.2. Comparison
Even though “deep fakes” is a relatively new problem,
there are a few papers in this domain. [56] employs a gen-
erative model for detection, but their model is restricted to
their previous generative method. [4] also claims a high de-
tection rate if the synthetic content is generated by [68] or
the VAE used in the FakerApp. [42] reports high accuracy,
however their approach is dependent on eye detection and
parameterization. All of these [66, 4, 56] employ neural net-
works blindly and do not make an effort to understand the
1Link is kept hidden to satisfy anonymity.
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generative noise that we experimentally characterized using
biological signals (Section 5.6).
However, in order to promote the effect of biological sig-
nals on the detection rate, we perform some experiments
with several networks: (i) a simple CNN, (ii) Inception V3
[65], (iii) Xception [17], (iv) ConvLSTM [62], (v-vii) three
best networks proposed in [66], and (viii) our approach.
Model Frame Face Video
Simple CNN 46.89% 54.56% 48.88%
InceptionV3 73.85% 60.96% 68.88%
Xception 78.67% 56.11% 75.55%
ConvLSTM 47.65% 44.82% 48.83%
[66] V1 86.26% - 82.22%
[66] V3 76.97% - 73.33%
[66] ensemble 83.18% - 80.00%
Ours - 87.62% 91.07%
Table 4: Comparison. Detection accuracies of several net-
works trained on images, face images, and videos. The next
best after our approach is 8.85% less accurate.
All experiments in Table 4 are performed on the same
train/test split of our Deep Fakes dataset, with same meta
parameters. We choose to compare on Deep Fakes dataset,
because it is more generalizable as discussed in the previous
section. For ConvLSTM and our approach, “Frame” and
“Face” indicate segment accuracy, for others they indicate
frame accuracy. The last column is video accuracy (Section
4.3) for all. We did not run [66] on face images because
their approach utilizes background, and we did not run ours
on entire frames because there is no biological signal in the
background. We emphasize that FakeCatcher performs
better than the best baseline architecture by 8.85%.
Based on our comprehensive experiments, we observe
that biological signals are not well-preserved in deep fakes
(Section 3.3), however, is the contribution of biological sig-
nals significant against pure ML approaches? We claim
that PPG maps encode authenticity using their spatial co-
herence and temporal consistency. To prove this, we train
the CNN in Section 4.4.2 with (i) input frames (46.89%),
(ii) faces cropped from input frames (54.56%), and (iii) our
PPG Maps (Section 4.4) (87.62%) as shown in Table 4. The
significant accuracy increase justifies the use of biological
signals. To ensure that this jump is not only the result of
temporal consistency, we compare it to the classification ac-
curacy of ConvLSTM on entire and face frames (47.65%
and 44.82%), which are even lower than frame-based meth-
ods. Thus, we certify that (1) biological signals are quan-
titatively more descriptive for deep fake detection, (2) both
spatial and temporal properties of biological signals are im-
portant, and (3) these enable our network to perform signif-
icantly better than complex and deeper networks.
5.3. Analysis of Segment Duration
Table 5 documents results on the test set, the entire [56]
dataset, and Deep Fakes dataset, using different segment du-
rations. Top half shows the effect of ω on the pairwise clas-
sification. The choice of ω = 300 (10 sec) is long enough
to detect strong correlations without including too many ar-
tifacts for video labels.
Preceded by probabilistic video classification, authentic-
ity classifier has flexible segment size, as incorrectly labeled
segments may be compensated in the later step. Selecting
a relatively smaller segment duration ω = 180 (6 sec), in-
creases the video classification accuracy while keeping it
long enough to extract biological signals. Note that when
we increase ω above a certain threshold, the accuracy drops
for Deep Fakes dataset. This is due to occlusion and illu-
mination artifacts, because the segment covers more facial
variety as ω increases.
ω dataset s. acc. v. acc. CNN s. CNN v.
64 FF test 95.75% - - -
128 FF test 96.55% - - -
256 FF test 98.19% - - -
300 FF test 99.39% - - -
64 FF 93.61% - - -
128 FF 94.40% - - -
256 FF 94.15% - - -
300 FF 95.15% - - -
128 DF 75.82% 78.57% 87.42% 91.07%
150 DF 73.30% 75.00% - -
180 DF 76.78% 80.35% 86.25% 85.71%
240 DF 72.17% 73.21% - -
300 DF 69.25% 66.07% - -
128 FF 77.50% 82.55% 94.26% 96%
150 FF 75.93% 78.18% - -
180 FF 75.87% 78.85% 92.56% 93.33%
256 FF 72.55% 73.82% - -
300 FF 75.00% 75.16% - -
450 FF 70.78% 71.33% - -
600 FF 68.75% 68.42% - -
Table 5: Accuracy per Segment Duration. Effects of ω,
on segment and video accuracies, using SVM and CNN
classifiers, on FF test, entire FF, and Deep Fakes (DF)
datasets. First 8 rows denote pairwise task.
5.4. Analysis of ROI
For our SVM classifier, biological signals are extracted
from three regions on the face. In this section, we assess
the effects of different sizes for these regions of interests.
We quantize the ROIs as very small (a few pixels), small,
default, big, and the whole face. Supplementary Material
C numerically documents these ROIs on different datasets
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Figure 8: ROI Contours. Whole face (a), big ROI (b), default (c), small ROI (d), few pixels (e), for GL and CL (blue), for
GM and CM (green), and for GR and CR (red).
with different segment durations. We plot the pairwise sep-
aration, segment classification, and video classification ac-
curacies per ROI sizes, on two datasets in Figure 9. Lastly,
we show these ROIs on a sample video frame in Figure 8,
where red contour corresponds to Gl and Cl, green to Gm
and Cm, and blue to Gr and Cr. We conclude that the de-
fault ROI is a generalizable choice with a good accuracy for
all cases.
Figure 9: ROI Comparison. Pairwise separation (left),
segment (middle), and video (right) classification accuracy
per several ROIs, on FF and DF datasets.
5.5. Blind Source Separation
To better understand our features, feature sets, and their
relative importance, we computed the Fisher criterion de-
tection [63] of linearly separable features if we have any.
No significantly high ratio was observed, neither for LDA
(linear discriminant analysis) [47], guiding us towards ker-
nel based SVMs and more feature space exploration. We
also applied PCA (principal component analysis) [74] and
CSP (common spatial patterns) [37] to reduce the dimen-
sionality of our feature spaces. Figure 10 shows 3D distri-
bution of original (red) and synthetic (blue) samples by the
most significant three components found by PCA, LDA, and
CSP, without clear class boundaries. We also tried to con-
dense the feature vector with our best classification accu-
racy. However, we achieved 71% accuracy after PCA and
65.43% accuracy after CSP.
5.6. Experimental Outcomes
Although our insights are spread throughout the paper,
we would like to summarize our findings below.
• Spatial coherence: Biological signals are not coher-
ently preserved in different synthetic facial parts.
• Temporal consistency: Synthetic content does not
contain frames with stable PPG. Aˆ and P of PPGs sig-
nificantly differ. However, inconsistency is not sepa-
rable into frequency bands (see Supplemental Material
B2-3).
• Combined artifacts: Spatial inconsistency is aug-
mented by temporal incoherence (see Ap(SC) exper-
iments).
• Artifacts as features: These artifacts can be captured
in explainable features by transforming biological sig-
nals (see Appendix A, and Tables 1&2). However
there is no clear separation or reduction of the feature
sets into lower dimensions (Section 5.5), thus CNN
classification performs better than SVM classification.
• Comprehensive analysis: Finally, our classifier has
higher accuracy for detection in the wild, for shorter
videos, and for mid-size ROIs (see Appendix C).
Figure 10: Feature Space. Original (red) and synthetic
(blue) samples in three dominant component space, ex-
tracted using PCA (left), LDA(mid), and CSP (right).
5.7. Implementation Details
For each video segment, we apply Butterworth filter [13]
with the frequency band of [0.7, 14]. We quantize the signal
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using Welch’s method [73]. Then, we collect frequencies
between [hlow, hhigh], which correspond to below, in, and
high ranges for heart beat. There is no clear frequency in-
terval that accumulated generative noise, so we include all
frequencies. We follow the PPG extraction methods in [79]
for GL, GM , GR and [19] for CL, CM , CR.
It is worth discussing that PPG signals extracted for heart
rate and for our detection task are not of the same qual-
ity. For accurate heart rate estimation, PPG signal goes
through significant denoising and componentization steps
to fit the signal into expected ranges and periods. We ob-
serve that some signal frequencies and temporal changes
that may be considered as noise for heart rate extraction
actually contains valuable information in terms of fake con-
tent. For our task, we only utilize their coherence among fa-
cial regions and their consistency across segments, achiev-
ing 99.39% pair separation accuracy on [56]. Therefore,
we intentionally did not follow some steps of cleaning the
PPG signals with the motivation of keeping subtle genera-
tive noise. Also, we attest that even though videos undergo
some transformations (e.g., illumination, resolution, and/or
compression), raw PPG correlation does not change in au-
thentic videos.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we present FakeCatcher, a fake portrait
video detector based on biological signals. We experimen-
tally validate that spatial coherence and temporal consis-
tency of such signals are not well preserved in GAN-erated
content. Following our statistical analysis, we are able to
create a robust synthetic video classifier based on physio-
logical changes. Furthermore, we encapsulate those signals
in novel PPG maps to allow developing a CNN-based clas-
sifier, which further improves our accuracy and is agnos-
tic to any generative model. We evaluate our approach for
pairwise separation and authenticity classification, of seg-
ments and videos, on Face Forensics [56] and newly in-
troduced Deep Fakes datasets, achieving 99.39% pairwise
separation accuracy, 96% constrained video classification
accuracy, and 91.07% in the wild video classification ac-
curacy. These results also verify that FakeCatcher detects
fake content with high accuracy, independent of the gener-
ator, content, resolution, and quality of the video.
Apart from the FakeCatcher and the Deep Fakes dataset,
we believe that a main contribution of this paper is to pro-
vide an in-depth analysis of deep fakes in the wild. To our
knowledge, generative models are not explored by biolog-
ical signals before, and we present the first experimental
literature survey for understanding and explaining human
signals in synthetic portrait videos. For FakeCatcher, we
see room for improvement by proposing a more complex
CNN architecture. However, we want to go further and de-
velop “BioGAN” that explores the possibility of a biolog-
ically plausible generative model. Although this may be
possible by introducing an extra discriminator whose loss
incorporates our findings to preserve biological signals, for-
mulating a differentiable loss function that follows the pro-
posed signal processing steps is not straightforward. Lastly,
we encourage continuation of generalizable fake detection
research by making our Deep Fakes dataset available to the
research community.
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